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Truth as Justice: 
Investigatory Commissions 
in Latin America 
Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht,Arriaza 
In recent years, Latin American countries have sought to come to terms 
with prior periods of widespread human rights violations, relying increasingly 
on investigatory commissions. Investigatory efforts have been undertaken by 
democratically elected governments that replaced military dictatorships, by 
UN,sponsored commissions as part of a UN,mediated peace process, and by 
national human rights commissioners. This article examines truth commis, 
sions in Chile and El Salvador, an investigatory effort in Honduras, and a 
proposed commission in Guatemala. It compares the achievements and limi, 
tations of these commissions within the political constraints and institutional 
reality of each country, focusing on four major goals: the effort to create an 
authoritative account of the past; vindication of victims; recommendations 
for legislative, structural, or other changes to avoid repetition of past abuses; 
and establishing accountability or the identity of perpetrators. 
In the past 15 years a growing number of countries have tried to come 
to terms with periods of widespread human rights violations, during which 
national institutions failed to address rights abuses. Increasingly, coming to 
terms has involved the constitution of investigatory commissions, often 
known as "truth commissions." These may be ad hoc commissions ap, 
pointed by the executive or by parliament, international commissions under 
United Nations (UN) or regional auspices, or those operating under a more 
permanent national structure like an ombudsman's office. Such commis, 
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sions have been constituted in at least 15 countries in the last 20 years. l In 
South Africa, in Haiti, in Guatemala, the creation of a truth commission 
tops the list of proposed measures for looking into past abuses. In the 
Balkans and Rwanda, although attention has focused on an international 
tribunal, commissions of inquiry were also created to gather the facts needed 
for subsequent prosecutions. Indeed, the truth commission model has be~ 
come so well known that it runs the danger of being perceived as something 
of a panacea rather than as one of a panoply of measures needed to under~ 
take the complex process of coming to terms with the past. 
This article looks at several investigatory commissions in Latin 
America and evaluates what they did, why they did it, and how successful 
they were at meeting their own stated and implicit goals. We look at the 
truth commissions of Chile and EI Salvador, a "truth commission"~like in~ 
vestigatory effort in Honduras, and a proposed commission in Guatemala. 
We evaluate the commissions by looking at four major, and overlapping, 
goals: creating an authoritative record of what happened; providing a plat~ 
form for the victims to tell their stories and obtain some form of redress; 
recommending legislative, structural, or other changes to avoid repetition of 
past abuses; and establishing who was responsible and providing a measure 
of accountability for the perpetrators. Regarding these objectives, we con~ 
sider how well each commission has done, which have taken precedence, 
and why.2 Part I sets out the context for the establishment of truth commis~ 
sions in Latin America, while Part II talks about the specific commissions. 
Part III evaluates the way each commission satisfied each of the goals dis~ 
cussed above. Part IV concludes by comparing the goals and exploring why 
the commissions focused their work as they did. 
1. For the most exhaustive list and description to date of truth commissions, see Priscilla 
B. Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994, A Comparative Study," 16 Hum. 
Rts. Q. 597 (Nov. 1994). 
2. It is difficult to assess the "success" of an investigatory commission in meeting these 
goals, at least in the short term. Its impact on a society and even its success on its own terms 
may well depend on the passage of time and the accretion of historical memory. Thus the 
impact of a commission's work may be perceived far differently now than 20 years hence. 
Moreover, the same constraints and possibilities that arise from the social context and polit~ 
ical culture and influence the choices made in serting up a commission are likely to determine 
the extent of follow-up to it-and may also dicrate the limits to its success. Thus it becomes 
virtually impossible to disentangle these "background" effects from the choices made by the 
commissions. Still, perhaps a measure of how well the commission met its goals is the extent 
to which its work ameliorated, or at least altered, these same background conditions. 
On the other hand, a "successful" commission may be more a reflection of favorable 
background conditions than of anything the commission does. In any case, while we recognize 
that the choices made about the content and method of the work of such a commission are 
not unconstrained, we believe that such choices exist and that different designs may produce 
different outcomes even within a similar set of constraints. We hope, therefore, that our 
exploration may prove useful to those in other countries who are beginning to grapple with 
the issues of truth ana justice in the context of successor regimes or negotiated settlements. 
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I. TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 
'f -1 
Truth commissions in Latin America have been formed in two kinds of 
circumstances. In the first, civilian governments have replaced formal or de 
facto military dictatorships. During the period of military rule, real or per, 
ceived government opponents were summarily killed, jailed, and tortured by 
the security forces and their allies. The scope and severity of human rights 
abuses led to demands on the new government for an accounting of the 
human rights violations of the prior regime. Chile and, to a lesser extent, 
Honduras fit this mold.3 
In the second scenario, demands for investigation have arisen in the 
context of a negotiated end to civil wars-wars that were themselves largely 
an outgrowth of frustration with exclusionary political and economic poli, 
cies.4 Aside from the summary execution, torture, or forced disappearance of 
those considered subversives, Latin American militaries carried out mas' 
sacres of peasant communities as part of their counterinsurgency strategy.5 
By the time these conflicts were settled, a civilian government already ex, 
isted, but military domination continued and large sectors of the population 
were still excluded from the political process. EI Salvador and Guatemala fit 
into this category. 
In both these scenarios, several factors encourage governments to 
choose the truth commission as the centerpiece of its efforts to confront the 
past. First, the need for "truth" is related to the types of violations commit, 
ted under the former regime or during a period of war. While most people 
had at least some inkling that human rights violations were occurring, the 
nature of the violations themselves-especially of disappearances and kill, 
ings by anonymous "death squads" -entailed secrecy and deniability. The 
phenomenon of "disappearances" was a particularly nefarious aspect of the 
military regimes: people were picked off the streets or from their homes, 
often by armed plainclothesmen, and never seen alive again. The detention 
was never acknowledged; the only clue family members had of the fate of 
those disappeared was the periodic appearance, in some countries, of muti, 
lated, often unidentifiable bodies along roadsides. When killings were offi, 
cially acknowledged, they were dismissed as the work of "subversives" or, at 
3. Argentina, not discussed here, also fits into this type of situation. The Argentine 
truth commission (the Sabato Commission) is discussed in, e.g., Hayner, 16 Hum. Rts. Q., 
and in International Commission of Jurists, "Human Rights in the World: Argentina, the 
Truth about the Disappeared," 33 Rev. Int'l Commission of Jurists 1-8 (Dec. 1984). 
4. See, e.g., Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America 
(New York: Norton, 1983). ' 
5. See, e.g., Ricardo Falla, Massacres in the Jungle, Ixcdn, Guatemala, 1975-1982 (Boul-
der, Col.: Westview Press, 1994) ("Falla, Massacres in the Jungle"); Mark Danner, The Massacre 
at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) ("Danner, Massacre 
at El Mozote"); United Nations, From Madness to Hope: The 12,¥ear War in El Salvador (Re-
port of the Commission on the Truth for EI Salvador) (U.N. Doc. S/25500; New York: 
United Nations, March 1993) ("UN, From Madness to Hope"). 
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best, the lamentable excesses of wartime, even if the victims were civilians 
with little or no connection to an armed organization. Often, killings took 
place in rural areas away from news media and on a scale that outside ob, 
servers found unbelievable. The victims were people marginalized by the 
dominant culture.6 Moreover, the shadowy nature of the killings instilled a 
climate of fear, suspicion, and social withdrawal. 7 In addition to official 
obfuscation and denials, the bodies of those disappeared have never been 
found, leaving family and friends with no possibility of closure. An account' 
ing became necessary on a personal as well as a historical level. 
Second, investigatory commissions shortcut some of the difficulties in, 
herent in using "normal" investigatory channels. Both the courts and the 
police had been at least complicit in the rights violations, and neither were 
capable of independent i~quiries; indeed, if the judiciary had fulfilled its 
function, an ad hoc commission would not be necessary. Reforming or cre, 
ating an independent, capable judiciary is a long' term undertaking. Consti, 
tutional provisions and reforms may slow the creation of new courts or the 
appointment of more independent judges. Assuring courts' independent 
functioning and revising the substantive and procedural codes under which 
they operate may take years. In many cases, the appointment of competent 
judges not associated with the failings of the past awaits the emergence and 
training of a new generation. The need for scrupulous attention to due pro' 
cess and avoidance of both ad hoc courts and ex post facto application of 
the criminal laws also limit the government's optionS. The sheer magnitude 
of past violations, a dearth of evidence concerning crimes that occurred 
years earlier, and the unwillingness of witnesses to testify in unreliable 
courts further complicate the task.8 So does the need for rapid resolution 
while the issue is still high on the government-and public-agenda. 
These difficulties lead many transitional governments to choose investiga, 
tory commissions over other methods to confront the past. 
6. In Central America, for example, most killings were of peasants. The EI Mozote mas-
sacre in El Salvador was a case in point: as many as 1,000 people, mostly children, were killed 
in December 1981. Contemporaneous eyewimess accounts were rejected by policymakers and 
much of the news media, who attributed the reports to FMLN propaganda. See Danner, Mas, 
sacre at El Mozote. In Guatemala, thousands of Indian peasants killed by the armed forces 
spoke no Spanish and followed indigenous tradirions. See Falla, Massacres in the Jungle. 
Throughout Latin America, governments consistently dismissed reports of gross human rights 
violations as communist propaganda aimed at discrediting them in international opinion. 
7. For a description of the effects of these kinds of terror on society, see Jaime Malamud-
Goti, "Transitional Governments in the Breach-Why Punish State Criminals?" 12 Hum. 
Rts. Q. 1 (1990); id., "Punishing Human Rights Abuses in Fledgling Democracies: The Case 
of Argentina," in Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed., Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and 
Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1995) ("Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and 
Human Rights"). 
8. Wimesses are often reluctant to testify in courts because they fear reprisals. When 
state institutions have been notoriously unreliable and unable to protect the victims of human 
rights violations, far more than a state change in policy will be needed to overcome legitimate 
fears. See UN, From Madness to Hope 23-24. 
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Political constraints on other types of actions, particularly those that 
more directly challenge the hegemony or institutional integrity of the 
armed forces, constitute a third factor. Here we must distinguish between 
the two variants discussed above: pacted transitions and negotiations to end 
a civil conflict. In both situations the room to maneuver will be limited by 
the still powerful presence of those responsible for the violations but in dif, 
ferent ways. In the first, the new government may perceive (rightly or 
wrongly) that more drastic measures to prosecute those allegedly responsible 
for violations or to restructure the offending institutions are not feasible 
given an unfavorable balance of forces. In the context of settlement of a 
civil conflict, the same government that committed or encouraged the vio, 
lations may have to implement steps toward "transition." Thus, domestic 
demands for accounting have been accompanied by increasing international 
insistence that governments, even successor governments, must take some 
action against those responsible for grave human rights violations.9 All 
these factors make investigatory commissions an attractive option, either as 
a first step opening the door to other actions or as a relatively cost,free way 
to meet popular demands for an accounting and then close the book on past 
violations. While the rhetoric of commissions has highlighted the former 
conception, the reality has been closer to the latter. The next section de' 
scribes the commissions established in Chile, EI Salvador, Honduras, and 
the one proposed for Guatemala. 
9. Under international law, the successor government is responsible for the acts of the 
prior regime, even though it in fact had no control over them and often those now in power 
were victims of the prior government. The law makes no provision for situations where one 
part of the state, i.e., the military, is not within the effective control of another part. In 
addition, there is increasing international recognition that states have a duty to investigate, 
prosecute, and provide some kind of redress for certain grave human rights violations, includ-
ing disappearances, widespread and systematic summary executions (or other crimes against 
humanity), and torture. As a corollary, while political crimes are amnestiable under interna-
tional law, this subset of crimes that must be prosecuted cannot be subject to a blanket pre-
investigation amnesty. See, e.g., Diane Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prose-
cute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime," 100 Yale L.J. 2537 (1991); Naomi Roht-
Artiaza, "State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in 
International Law," 78 Cal. L. Rell. 449 (1990); Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Commission II. Uruguay, report No. 29/92, 82d Sess., OENSer. L/V/lI.82, Doc. 24 (2 
Oct. 1992); id., Report on the Situation a/Human Rights in El Salliador, OEA/Ser.LN/lI.85, doc. 
28 rev., 11 Feb. 1994, at 69-77 ("IACHR, Report on Human Rights in El Salvaden"); Velasquez 
Rodriguez case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No.4 (1988) (judgment). 
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II. THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONS 
A. The Chilean Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 
(the "Rettig Commission") 
Chile returned to democratic government in March 1990, when Presi, 
dent Patricio Aylwin was elected after 17 years of milit~ry rule. The process 
of transition was designed by the military government, which allowed elec, 
tions in exchange for the political parties' agreement to respect the consti, 
tutional structure put in place by the military. Despite the election of a 
civilian president, the former head of government, General Pinochet, re, 
mained as head of the army, a number of Senate seats remained subject to 
Pinochet's appointment rather than election, and military and judicial 
structures remained intact. In these circumstances, the new president con, 
fronted the problem of human rights violations committed during the mili, 
tary regime: summary executions, forced disappearances, widespread torture, 
arbitrary detention, and forced exile. 
The new government's most important initiative was the creation of 
the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. Io The commission's mandate 
was to "clarify in a comprehensive manner the truth about the most serious 
violations committed in recent years," establishing "the most complete pic, 
ture possible of these grave events, as well as their antecedents and circum, 
stances," and "to gather evidence that may make it possible to identify the 
victims by name and determine their fate or whereabouts."ll The mandate 
to identify individual victims was restricted to cases of death or disappear, 
ance, as these were the most serious violations and those consistently de, 
nied by the military; the mandate did not extend to torture not resulting in 
death, which the new preSident's advisors felt would be too unwieldy an 
enterprise to be completed within the allotted time.12 The commission was 
also to propose measures for reparations and reinstatement and to recom, 
10. The commission was created by Ministry of the Interior Decree No. 355 of 25 April 
1990, published in the Diario Oficial (9 May 1990). The Commission was esrablished by presi-
dential decree after opposition parties in the legislature indicated they would oppose a legisla-
tive commission. 
11. Report of the Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 7, tranS. Phillip 
Benyman (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1993) ("Report of the Chilean National Com, 
mission"). Several accounts of the commission's work have appeared in English. In addition to 
the introduction to the English version of the report by Jose Zalaquett, see Jose Zalaquett, 
"Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Consttaints: The Dilemma of New Democracies 
Conftonting Past Human Rights Violations," 43 Hastings L.J. 1425 (1992); Jorge Cortea S., 
"Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chilean Case after Dictatorship," 67 NotTe 
Dame L.R. 1455 (1992); David Weissbrodt & Paul Fraser, "The Report of the Chilean Na-
tional Commission on Truth and Reconciliation," 14 Hum. Rts. Q. 601 (1992); Robert 
Quinn, "Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model," 62 Fordham L. ReI!. 905 (1994). 
12. See Correa, 67 NotTe Dame L. ReI!. at 1473; Weissbrodt & Fraser, 14 Hum. Rts. Q. 
at 616. 
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mend legal and administrative measures to prevent any recurrence of these 
acts. 
The commission, chaired by jurist Raul Rettig, was composed of eight 
people, including several conservative scholars and jurists considered close 
to (or at least not opposed to) the military government as well as people 
with a record of advocacy on human rights. The Commission worked for 
nine months with a staff of 60, interviewing thousands of witnesses 
throughout the country and at embassies abroad. Commission members also 
made extensive use of the documents and files of domestic and interna, 
tional human rights groups. The work of forensic anthropologists in digging 
up clandestine cemeteries and, in some cases, identifying the remains for 
reburial, also contributed to the commission's work. The commission asked 
for comments from the armed forces or police on evidence implicating them 
in crimes but received little substantive response. 
The commission presented its final, unanimous report in February 
1991. President Aylwin accepted the report and, a month later, announced 
its main findings on national television. He offered a formal apology on 
behalf of the government for the acts of its agents. The report was reprinted 
and circulated and widely reported on in the press. Unfortunately, shortly 
after the report was presented, the assassination of right,wing senator Jaime 
Guzman shifted media attention and cut short public discussion of further 
follow,up to the report. I3 Since that time, it has not been a major topic of 
public debate, although, as discussed below, the issue of accountability did 
not completely disappear. 
The report included an explanation of the origins of the violations, 
their nature, and the institutions responsible. It provided individualized in' 
formation on a large number of victims. It found 1,068 cases of killings by 
agents of the state, 957 cases of persons detained and disappeared by state 
agents, 90 killed by violent opposition groups, and 164 cases involving 
political violence that could not be attributed to any party. In another 614 
cases, the Commission could not come to any conclusions due to lack of 
evidence. The Commission could not establish the fate or whereabouts of 
most victims, although it assumed those forcibly disappeared had been 
killed. Nor did the Commission provide information on those individuals 
who carried' out the deaths and disappearances, limiting its discussion to 
naming the branch of the armed forces, security forces or opposition groups 
believed to be responsible. 
The commission devoted a large portion of the report to the effects of 
these crimes on the victims, their families, and the larger social fabric. It 
recommended reparations to the victims of past violations, including both 
moral and material compensation. A direct outgrowth of the Commission 
13. See Weissbrodt & Fraser, 14 Hum. Rts. Q. at 622; A. Trushin, "Left,Wing Terrorist 
Faces Trial in Chilean Court," Tass News Service, 10 Jan. 1994. 
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was the February 1992 law, which created the National Corporation for 
Reparation and Reconciliation.14 The corporation established a monthly 
pension for the families of those named in the report, medical benefits (in, 
cluding psychological counseling) for the families, and a subsidy for the high 
school and college education of the victims' children. 
In addition, the Rettig Commission's report called for human rights 
education for both the military and civilians, especially lawyers and judges; 
greater judicial independence; and changes in the laws on states of emer, 
gency, military jurisdiction over civilians, and criminal procedure generally. 
It recommended greater adherence to international human rights treaties 
and standards, including specific changes in domestic law. In addition, it 
called for the creation of a human rights ombudsman's office. Finally, it 
called on the government to commemorate the victims through monuments 
and support for cultural and artistic wqrks. 
B. The Salvadoran Truth Commission 
The Salvadoran Truth Commission, in contrast, was based on a negoti, 
ated agreement between an undefeated military and an undefeated insur, 
gency. During the 1980s El Salvador was ravaged by a civil war. Unlike 
countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America where a debilitated or 
defeated guerrilla movement served as the pretext for dictatorship and state 
terrorism, the Salvadoran military faced the most effective guerrilla move, 
ment in the continent. Because the FMLN had not been defeated and en' 
joyed substantial support inside El Salvador as well as international 
recognition, it was able to negotiate a far,reaching peace accord as the price 
for ending the war. Nonetheless, the "transition" government was the same 
government that had fought the war-a situation with profound implica, 
tions for the Truth Commission. 
Another distinguishing feature of the Salvadoran peace process was the 
unprecedented involvement of international actors, notably the United Na-
tions, in the resolution of the conflict and the implementation of the peace 
accords. IS International human rights experts working with the UN played 
crucial roles in this process.I6 
14. Decreto-Ley 19.123 (8 Feb. 1992). 
15. See UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277, 17 
June 1992. 
16. Venezuelan jurist Dr. Pedro Nikken was the UN's advisor on human rights during 
the peace negotiations and is now the UN's Independent Expert on the Situation of Human 
Rights in EI Salvador. He was a member of the Inter-American Human Rights Court which 
heard and decided the Velasquez-Rodriguez case. Truth Commission member Thomas Bu-
ergenthal was president of the Inter-American Human Rights Court during that period. The 
1987-88 decision of the Inter-American Human Rights Court was crucial in defining the 
state's obligation to guarantee human rights, including preventing, investigating, and prose-
cuting violations. 
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Through the negotiations that ended the Salvadoran conflict, several 
mechanisms were established to overcome impunity and guarantee human 
rights. In addition to the Truth Commission, these included a commission 
to purge the military of human rights violators (the "Ad Hoc Commis, 
sion"), a new Human Rights Ombudsman, the replacement of military se, 
curity forces with a new civilian police force, and constitutional reforms to 
increase the independence of the judiciary. Of these, the Ad Hoc Commis, 
sion was particularly important. Composed of three distinguished 
Salvadorans, it reviewed the records of the Salvadoran officer corps and 
recommended the transfer, retirement, or discharge of more than 100 of, 
ficers implicated in human rights abuses.J7 
During the negotiations, the parties presented various proposals to end 
impunity, including lists of well,known cases that should be prosecuted to 
serve as examples. Unable to agree on the list of cases, the parties ultimately 
accepted a UN proposal to establish a "Truth Commission" to determine 
the official truth about the most "important acts of violence" that occurred 
during the war. The parties recognized the need to make the complete truth 
known and to "put an end to any indication of impunity on the part of 
officers of the armed forces particularly in cases where respect for human 
rights is jeopardized."IB The government and the FMLN agreed to provide 
full cooperation, as well as to carry out the commission's recom, 
mendations.19 
The commission's mandate was to investigate "serious acts of violence 
that occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands 
that the public should know the truth." It was to take into consideration the 
"exceptional importance that may be attached to the acts to be investi, 
gated, their characteristics and impact, and the social unrest to which they 
gave rise" as well as the need to build confidence in the positive changes 
being promoted by the peace process. It was also to recommend legal, polit, 
ical, or administrative measures to prevent the repetition of the kinds of acts 
that occurred in the past and initiatives to promote national reconciliation. 
The negotiators agreed that the Truth Commission would be headed 
by three individuals appointed by the UN Secretary General. Because of the 
extreme polarization of Salvadoran society, the parties ultimately agreed to 
entrust this task to foreigners. After consultation with both parties, the UN 
Secretary General named former Colombian president BeHsario Betancur, 
17. The exact number of officers involved only became known when the UN published 
a letter from the UN Secretary General to the Security Council. UN Doc. S/25078, 9 Jan. 
1993. 
18. Chapultepec Agreements between the Government of EI Salvador and the FMLN, 
ch. I, "Armed Forces," sec. 5, "End to Impunity," in United Nations, El Salvador Agreements: 
The Path to Peace (San Salvador: United Nations Department of Public Information No. 
1208,92614, July 1992) ("UN, Path to Peace"). 
19. UN, Path to Peace, Truth Commission Agreement, Undertaking by the Parties, at 31. 
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former Venezuelan foreign minister Reinaldo Figueredo, and u.s. law pro· 
fessor Thomas Buergenthal to the Truth Commission. For the first time, an 
inquiry commission of this kind was UN·sponsored. To protect the commis· 
sion's independence, both in reality and in appearance, all funds and staff 
came from outside EI Salvador.20 
The Truth Commission undertook to establish the facts about the vio· 
lence that occurred in EI Salvador during 12 years of war. With a six·month 
mandate to carry out its enormous task, the commission could only selec· 
tively investigate some of the tens of thousands of cases that occurred dur· 
ing the war. The Commission received more than 2,000 testimonies about 
violations involving more than 7,000 victims. It focused on a smaller uni· 
verse of particularly important or representative cases. In addition to inter· 
viewing victims and survivors, it also interviewed military men of all ranks, 
FMLN members, lawye~s and court personnel, government officials and em· 
ployees. It collected information from a variety of sources including human 
rights groups inside and outside EI Salvador, and Salvadoran institutions as 
well as foreign governments and agencies. 
The commission published the results of its investigation in 32 cases. 
In roughly half those cases, the commission found sufficient evidence to 
name individuals found to have committed, ordered, or covered up the acts 
investigated. Some 40 military officers were named, most of whom were no 
longer in active service. Six leaders of the Peoples Revolutionary Army 
(ERP, one of the five component organizations of the FMLN) were named 
as responsible for implementing a policy of killing mayors. Others named 
included civil defensemen, judges, an army lawyer, and several civilians. 
The U.S. role was not examined, nor were most of the civilians who fi· 
nanced and planned death squad actions named. 
The commission recommended a number of measures to prevent the 
repetition of abuses and foster national reconciliation. One of the most con· 
ttoversial concerned the judiciary, which the commission found responsible 
for helping perpetuate impunity. The commission recommended that all 
members of the Supreme Court immediately resign to hasten the appoint, 
ment of new justices under a new constitutional formula. In addition, the 
commission recommended that anyone named in the report be removed 
from any post in the armed forces, the judiciary or public administration, 
and that a law be drafted preventing those named from holding public of, 
fice for at least 10 years. The report also called for a full investigation of 
private armed groups (death squads), for the creation of a fund for compen, 
sation of victims to be financed by earmarking 1 % of foreign aid for this 
purpose, and for the government to carry out fully the reforms specified in 
20. See Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., "International Truth Commissions and Justice," 5 Aspen 
Inst. Q. 69 (Summer 1993). 
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the sections of the peace accords dealing with the armed forces, the police, 
and the judiciary.21 
C. The Honduran National Commissioner for the Protection 
of Human Rights 
Unlike the prior examples, the Honduran investigation into human 
rights violations committed by the military was carried out by an individual 
rather than a commission. Thus, there was no "truth commission," strictly 
speaking, but the investigation served many of the same functions.22 Rather 
than an initial focus on past rights violations, the Honduran inquiry arose 
out of a forward,looking attempt to curb new abuses. 
During the 1980s, although ruled by nominally civilian governments, 
the Honduran armed forces were the country's most powerful" political ac, 
tors. Several hundred people disappeared, and others, especially peasant and 
union organizers, were killed in an attempt to head off the creation of an' 
tigovernment insurgencies then flourishing in neighboring countries. In ad, 
dition, Honduras soon became the main base for the U.S.,backed "contra" 
war against Nicaragua, further increasing the power of the armed forces. 
When the war against Nicaragua ended, army power declined and civilian 
governments began some timid reforms, which gradually gained speed with 
the 1993 election of Roberto Reina as president. 
In 1992, then,President Callejas created an ombudsman's office, 
known as the Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights. To guar, 
antee its independence, the commissioner was to be selected by the presi, 
dent from a list provided by a National Reconciliation Commission and 
could only be removed by a two,thirds vote of that commission. All civil 
and military authorities were to cooperate with, and could not suspend, the 
Commissioner's investigationsP . 
21. UN, From Madness to Hope, annex (1 April 1993), at 185-98 (cited in note 5). 
These reforms included creation of a new civilian police force incorporating a limited number 
of former FMLN combatants, reduction in the size of the army, dismantling militarized secur, 
ity forces, dismissal or retirement of the worst human rights offenders, and reforms aimed at 
ensuring greater judicial independence. 
22. Hayner, 16 Hum. Rts. Q. n. 9 (cited in note I), does-not include it in her list of 15 
truth commissions, noting that it calls on the government to establish a truth commission 
with greater access to restricted information to investigate the full truth. Nonetheless, because 
the Honduran effort suggests another model for investigating past violations, we include it 
here. 
23. The commissioner's office was established by Decree·Law 26·92 of 8 June 1992, and 
its independence was further guaranteed by Executive Decree 6/51·92 of 8 Sept. 1992. The 
office is responsible for overseeing acts and measures necessary to ensure respect for human 
rights, investigate violations, and oversee Honduras's compliance with international human 
rights norms. See Comisionado Nacional de Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos, Los Hechos 
Hablan par Si Mismos (Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Ed. Guaymuras, 1994) ("Valladares Report"). 
The report has been translated into English as National Commissioner for Protection of 
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Shortly after his election, Commissioner Leo Valladares, responding to 
demands from human rights and other organized groups, began investigating 
a pattern of disappearances that had taken place in Honduras from 1980 to 
1993, most during the early 1980s. Valladares, a member of the Inter~Amer~ 
ican Commission on Human Rights, was profoundly influenced by the juris~ 
prudence of the Inter~American Commission and Court requiring 
investigation and sanction of those responsible for disappearances.24 He jus~ 
tified his efforts on two grounds: First, it was necessary to ''know the Truth 
and do Justice to achieve the needed reconciliation of all Hondurans,"25 
because it is impossible to forgive without knOWing what happened or who 
was responsible. Second, investigation was necessary to restore public confi~ 
dence in state institutions, especially the judiciary. 
Valladares found 179 cases of disappearances carried out by the armed 
forces. He named several members of the army high command and specific 
units, such as Intelligence Battalion 3~16, as responsible for the practice of 
disappearances. The court system also came in for criticism for its inaction 
in the face of the disappearances. The report contains a chronology of disap~ 
pearances, gleaned from press reports, a list of those who disappeared, and 
more detailed accounts of 14 representative disappearance cases. It also in~ 
eludes testimony given before the Inter~American Court of Human Rights. 
Unlike the Salvadoran commission, the Honduran commissioner ex~ 
amined in detail the international context of the disappearances. He dis~ 
cussed the roles of the Nicaraguan contras, their U.S. advisors, and 
Argentine military trainers in both engaging in and abetting disappear~ 
ances. The report published the names of a number of Argentine trainers, as 
well as providing detailed documents regarding U.S. participation in the 
anti~Sandinista war waged from southern Honduras. However, Valladares 
was careful to note that the contras and their backers enjoyed the protection 
of Honduran officials, thus implicating the state. Nonetheless, the report's 
recommendations ask for more information from both the United States 
and Argentina on their role in the events described and suggest identifying 
and extraditing those former members of the Nicaraguan contras alleged to 
have been involved in disappearances on Honduran soil. 
The commissioner recommended that those apparently involved in the 
disappearances be tried by the appropriate courts; he provided a list of those 
who occupied certain military posts during the years involved. In addition, 
Human Rights, Honduras: The Facts Speak for Themselves (New York: Human Rights Watch! 
Americas and Center for Justice and International Law, 1994) ("Honduras"). 
24. See Velasquez~Rodriguez case (cited in note 9) (establishing a state's duty to investi~ 
gate disappearances); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Reports No. 29/92 
(Uruguay), and No. 24/92 (Argentina), 82d Sess., OEA/Ser.LN/lI.82, Docs. 24, 25 (2 Oct. 
1992) (the commission, of which Valladares is a member, holds that there are international 
law limits to posttransition amnesties). 
25. Valladares Report at 9. 
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the report recommended investigations of all those judges and magistrates 
who denied habeas corpus petitions filed by family members of the disap~ 
peared, changes in the laws governing detentions, periodic visits of human 
rights groups to detention centers, creation of a special commission to find 
clandestine cemeteries, extradition of foreign military advisors or contras in~ 
volved in disappearances, the separation of military and police functions, 
civilian control over military intelligence, the institution of human rights 
education and adhesion of Honduras to several human rights treaties. Fi~ 
nally, it recommended an official apology, compensation, and an official 
monument to the disappeared. 
, The report was published in January 1994; excerpts appeared in the 
local press. In an attempt to both measure and increase pressure for compli~ 
ance, the commissioner announced that he would be reviewing the recom~ 
mendations in a year's time to evaluate what action had been taken. He is 
now preparing a follow~up report. 
D. The Guatemalan Agreement to Form a Truth Commission 
The problem of impunity has been central to peace negotiations be~ 
tween the Guatemalan government and a 20~year~old guerrilla movement, 
now known as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG). 
After years of unproductive negotiations, in January 1994-under intense 
pressure to end Central America's only remaining war-the two sides 
signed a framework agreement designed to lead to the signing of a definitive 
peace accord by the end of 1994. In March 1994, the parties signed a Global 
Accord on Human Rights. Point 3 of this Accord, entitled "Commitment 
against Impunity," states: 
3.1 The two sides coincide in that firm action is needed against im~ 
punity. The Government will not instigate the adoption of legislative 
or any other kind of measures aimed at impeding the trial and punish~ 
ment of those responsible for human rights violations. 
In addition, the government pledged to specifically criminalize disap~ 
pearances and summary executions, to press internationally for their pro~ 
scription as crimes against humanity, and to avoid trying human rights 
violators outside the normal court system.26 
The government further agreed to strengthen the office of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman, combat the existence of clandestine security forces and 
26. Global Accord on Human Rights between the Government of the Republic of Gua-
temala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), Mexico City, 29 March 
1994, UN Doc. A/48/928-S/1994/448, 8 April 1994, reprinted in 1 Verdad y Vida xxv 
Oan.-Mar. 1994). 
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death squads, not to create new civil defense forces "so long as there is no 
reason to do so," and to provide special protection for human rights activi~ 
ties and organizations and special help to the victims of human rights viola~ 
tions. However, a government agreement to "continue the cleansing and 
professionalization of the security forces" is thus far not supported by any 
mechanism to clean out notorious human rights violators or to place the 
police under civilian leadership.27 
As in El Salvador, the accord is to be subject to verification by a UN 
Observer Mission. Under intense international pressure, in June 1994 the 
parties agreed to the formation of a truth commission.28 The commission's 
mandate is to "clarify with all objectivity, equity, and impartiality the 
human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatema~ 
Ian population to suffer, connected with the armed conflict." Thus, the 
commission is to look both at the acts of state and nonstate actors, but it is 
unclear whether its mandate extends to the thousands of killings and disap~ 
pearances, especially of students, union leaders, priests, and others, who 
were not involved in armed opposition. The commission's mandate dates 
from the "beginning of the armed conflict," which has been interpreted to 
mean from 1960 to the signing of a peace accord. The commission will have 
up to one year in which to present its findings. 
In the preamble to the truth commission accord, the parties refer to 
"the right [of the Guatemalan people] to know the whole truth concerning 
these events, clarification of which will help avoid a repetition of these sad 
and painful events and strengthen the process of democratization in Guate~ 
mala." The commission is to present a report on its findings and recommend 
measures "to preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mu~ 
tual respect and observance of human rights and strengthen the democratic 
process." However, the commission is not mandated to name individual per~ 
petrators, nor will the report have "judicial aim or effect." The signatories to 
the agreement also made no commitment to carry out the commission's 
recommendations. 
The UN moderator for the peace negotiations will be one of the mem~ 
bers of the truth commission and will name the other two Guatemalan 
members with the agreement of the parties. One is to be a citizen of "irre~ 
proachable conduct" and the other an academic selected from a list of three 
proposed by the university presidents. The commission is to begin its work 
27. As of late 1994, topics relating to the role of the military and constitutional reform 
remained to be negotiated; however, there was little expectation that these kinds of agree-
ments would be reached. Unlike the Salvadoran military, which while not defeated found 
itself unable to defeat the FMLN, the Guatemalan military considers itself victorious and has 
shown little disposition to make concessions. 
28. Accord on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Vio-
lations and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, signed 
in Oslo, Norway, 23 June 1994, UN doc. A/48/954-S/1994/751, 1 July 1994 ("Accord on the 
Establishment of the Commission"). 
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after a final peace accord has been signed and a cease' fire is in effect. Since 
the signing of the truth commission agreement in June 1994, further negoti, 
ations have stalled. The parties are well behind their ambitious schedule, 
which called for the peace process to conclude in December 1994, although 
the UN Observer Mission was put in place in late 1994. 
III. EVALUATION IN LIGHT OF STATED AND 
IMPLICIT GOALS OF THE COMMISSIONS 
A. Establishing an Authoritative Record 
The first goal that all the commissions set for themselves is to compile 
and present a historical record of the scope, means, and victims of the prior 
human rights violations. Presentation of a full and unbiased record was im, 
portant both to counter the deceptions and justifications of the military and 
to move fairly recent and still,potent events into the more distant category 
of "history," establishing a line between past and present. In a politically 
charged atmosphere, creating an authoritative history is not an easy task. 
The commissions created their authority through their composition and 
through the scope and method of investigation. 
1. Composition 
To be successful, investigatory commissions must establish both their 
independence from all the actors in a contested history and their moral 
authority to examine and judge the acts and motivations of others. Each of 
the commissions chose a different route to establishing independence and 
moral authority. The Chilean commission tried to balance well,known 
figures from across the political spectrum; it included former ministers of the 
Pinochet government (although none directly involved in military or secur, 
ity posts) as well as long' time human rights activists. Moreover, the even 
number of commissioners was intended to maximize the chances of a unani, 
mous outcome. To some extent, this tactic seems to have been successful: 
even though the armed forces and the political right have disagreed with 
the commission's analysis, few have challenged the factual basis of its report. 
On the other hand, human rights activists have noted the timidity of the 
report, which may also be due to the effort to be "balanced" and maintain 
consensus, as well as to limits in the commission's mandate.29 
29. For example, critics noted that the report did not name the names of perpetrators, 
did not recommend prosecutions, and did not single out the armed forces as having qualita-
tively different responsibility for human rights violations, as compared with the political par-
ties, the church, and other actors in Chilean society. See Jorge Mera, "Truth and Justice in 
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The Salvadoran truth commission tried to ensure both independence 
and moral authority through the appointment of well~respected foreign dig~ 
nitaries as commissioners and through prohibiting the use of Centcil Amer-
icans as staff to the commission. Undoubtedly, an international commission 
has several advantages: distance from domestic political squabbles, a claim 
to greater objectivity and disinterestedness, a higher degree of protection 
from reprisals, the clout to publicize its recommendations internationally 
and to use international pressure to see them implemented. This very dis-
tance may, however, prove problematic, giving rise to both a perception 
and, possibly, the reality that the report is merely a UN document which 
gives all outside vision of a historical period and contains conclusions that 
may be discounted rather than being officially assumed. Yet in a situation in 
which there has not been a change in government and the country remains 
highly polarized, it may be the only viable alternative. 
The decision in El Salvador to have 'an international commission 
under UN auspices instead of a commission of national notables had several 
ramifications. On the negative side, foreigners, especially staff, not im-
mersed in the Salvadoran context may have encountered difficulties in per-
ceiving the relative importance of certain cases as well as the consequences 
of some of their decisions and recommendations. In contrast to the commis~ 
sions in the Southern Cone, this process did not bring together diverse na~ 
tional actors to write a common history. The international na~ure of the 
Salvadoran commission became a target of attack from quarters dissatisfied 
with its findings and recommendations who charged that Salvadoran sover~ 
eignty had been violated and judicial functions usurped.30 Government offi~ 
cials, members of the ruling party and military officers rejected and attacked 
the report. 
Outside the country, however, and in many quarters in El Salvador, 
UN sponsorship enhanced the commission's credibility. Precisely because 
they were outsiders, the three commissioners and their staff could ask hard 
questions and push to get information in a way that would have been diffi~ 
cult for Salvadorans or those closer to the conflict. Their efforts were bol~ 
stered by their UN status, which led many people to come forward who had 
never presented their testimony to national human rights groups.Jl Despite 
the Democratic Government," in Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and Human Rights ch. 12 (cited in 
note 7) ("Mera, 'Truth and Justice' "). 
30. The indictment of Truth Commission member Figueredo by Venezuelan courts on 
charges of corruption related to the government of Carlos Andres Perez gave ammunition to 
those in Salvadoran society who disagreed with the report's findings. The Venezuelan charges 
first appeared in the Salvadoran press as the commission's report was about to be published. 
31. Thomas Buergenthal, "The United Nations Truth Commission for EI Salvador," 27 
VanderbiltJ. Transnat'l L. 497, 542 (1994). 
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official rejection, a public opinion poll conducted in "June 1993 indicated 
wide acceptance of the Commission's findings.32 
Honduras used still a third approach: a well,respected individual 
closely connected to and backed by international connections. Commis, 
sioner Valladares gained international recognition and some degree of pro' 
tection from his status as a member of the Inter,American Commission on 
Human Rights. He worked closely with several UN advisors but presented 
his findings as part of a national institution that was itself part of the rna' 
chinery of government. Although the head of the army was predictably crit, 
ical, the report was well received by the new president, by official political 
sectors, and even by a few members of the armed forces, anxious to put the 
past behind them. It was given wide press circulation. The Honduran solu, 
tion seems to offer familiarity with local political nuances, less tendency 
toward timidity in the name of maintaining unity, and some degree of inter, 
national scrutiny and backing. However, an individual may not carry the 
same weight as a special or international commission and may find it harder 
to get his or her recommendations implemented, as we discuss below. 
The Guatemalan model foresees a hybrid commission, composed of 
one international representative and two "notables." It remains to be seen 
how well this composition will work in a highly polarized situation.33 Given 
the extreme polarization of Guatemalan society and the well,founded fear of 
military infiltration of other "reformed" investigatory bodies, concerns have 
been raised that Guatemalan participation in the commission may frighten 
potential witnesses. 
32. The poll, carried out by the Public Opinion Institute of the Central American Uni-
versity (UCA), found that 45% of Salvadorans questioned were satisfied with the Truth 
Commission's report, while 27% were dissatisfied. Three·fourths of those polled favored the 
removal from office of officials found to have violated human rights. Universidad Cen-
troamericana Jose Sime6n Canas, Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica, Bolettn de 
Prensa, Ano VIII, No.2, "La Opini6n de los Salvadorenos sobre la Comisi6n de la Verdad" 
(1993). 
33. National commissions, unless they have strong international backing, may be more 
problematic in cases of settlement of civil conflicts. For example, the Ad Hoc Commission in 
EI Salvador, created at the same time as the truth commission, was composed of three 
Salvadorans who reviewed the human rights records of military officers and recommended the 
transfer or discharge of 102 officers, including most of the high command. Implementation of 
their key recommendations only occurred afrer the UN Secretary General stepped in to de-
mand compliance. Without the UN's involvement, they might well have engaged in a fu· 
tile-and dangerous-exercise. The joint group to examine ongoing death squad activities in 
EI Salvador, formed as a result of one of the truth commission's recommendations, was a 
combined effort of Salvadorans and UN personnel. Because of the Salvadorans' involvement, 
a number of organizations and individuals considered it less trustworthy than the truth com-
mission and chose not to share their information with it. 
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2. Scope and Methodology of the Report 
To create authoritative history, a commission's work must be broad 
enough to cover the principal harms and to focus on the appropriate time 
period; it must be detailed enough to convince skeptics that the facts found 
are true, yet must also provide the overall patterns and explanations that 
shape historical accounts; and it must use fact~finding methods that are un~ 
derstandable and beyond challenge. To some extent, each commission did 
this, yet each also encountered serious constraints and limits. 
Each commission focused on a limited set of crimes: deaths and forced 
disappearances. These were the worst crimes, and the ones the perpetrators 
had most often denied. Other crimes, such as the torture of detainees who 
survived, were treated in much less detail. While justified because of time 
and staff limits, this exclusion, especially in the Chilean case, was criticized 
by human rights groups and may have limited the depth of the commission's 
recommendations in the area of treatment of detainees.34 The Honduran 
investigation was limited to disappearances, because these had been by far 
the most widespread although not the only serious rights violation, espe~ 
cially during the early 1980s. Moreover, the Honduran commissioner placed 
great emphasis on the "right to the truth," which required above all an 
accounting for those whose fate had never been established.35 
A second, related question concerns the degree to which a commission 
chooses to focus in depth on a limited number of exemplary cases while 
listing minimal data for others, as the Salvadoran Truth Commission did, or 
tries to provide information on a wider range of events. Selective investiga~ 
tion has the advantage of allowing betteNesearched conclusions about the 
origins and responsibility for cases chosen but must take care to stress their 
representative character. Of course, to some degree the choice can only be 
made in context. While in Honduras it would have lessened the report's 
credibility if it had not tried to investigate all 179 disappearance cases, 
surely in El Salvador, with more than 50,000 killed and thousands disap~ 
peared, such an undertaking was untenable. The Guatemalan commission 
will face a particularly difficult challenge because of the extended time pe~ 
riod to be examined (over 30 years) and a larger number of victims than in 
any other Latin American country's recent history. An added difficulty in 
34. Several countries where truth commissions operated, including Chile, continue to 
experience periodic reports of torture of prisoners. On Chile, see Amnesty International, 1993 
Report (London: Amnesty International, 1993) (torture and mistreatment of suspects in police 
custody); on Argentina, see Americas Watch and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, PoUce 
Violence in Argentina: Torture and Killings in Buenos Aires 20 (New York: Americas Watch, 
1991). On EI Salvador, see UN Observer Mission Report of the Director of the Human Rights 
Division of ONUSAL covering the period 1 March-30 June 1994, UN Doc. A/49/281, 28 
July 1994, at para. 66. 
35. See Carlos Chipoco, "EI Derecho a la Verdad: Un Analisis Comparativo" (presented 
at 18th Latin American Studies Association Congress, March 1994, Atlanta). 
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the Guatemalan case is that most of the victims were indigenous peasant 
farmers of Mayan descent. It will no doubt be much harder to track down 
the names and circumstances of death of these people than it would be if 
most victims were urban and working or middle class. 
Part of establishing a credible history is the simple listing of names, 
dates, and places compiled directly from witnesses and victims' families and 
indirectly from national and international human rights groups and press 
sources. Listing names rather than overall numbers precludes accusations of 
double counting and makes the cumulative horror more real. Relying on 
primary sources rather than press reports also increases credibility: in that 
sense the Honduran report, which did little independent investigation, was 
open to critique. 
The main achievement of the Salvadoran commission was the exhaus, 
tive investigation of a number of highly publicized and contested cases. The 
commission's report fixed blame on the army high command (including De' 
fense Minister Ponce) for the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests, their house, 
keeper, and her daughter. It credited ARENA party founder Roberto 
D'Aubuisson with organizing death squads and planning the murder of 
Archbishop Romero. These findings were long suspected among political 
circles in EI Salvador, but the amount of evidence unearthed by the com' 
mission is likely to make its report the definitive version of these events 
into the future. 
None of the commissions succeeded in finding the whereabouts or re, 
mains of the disappeared; the meager results were particularly disappointing 
in Chile, where the commission's mandate explicitly called for it to do so. 
The main obstacle was the lack of cooperation from the military and the 
limited power of an ad hoc commission to compel testimony and production 
of documents. The inability to call hostile witnesses, preserve or obtain doc, 
uments, and/or visit military or police installations has made it difficult for 
most investigatory commissions to go beyond descriptions of general 
patterns. 
To some degree, the lack of subpoena powers is a function of official 
fears that such powers would be useless in the face of military or police 
stonewalling and would set up an unwanted confrontation; that is, it reflects 
the general weakness of civilian government faced with a strong and recalci, 
trant military. A strategy for confronting the general difficulty of obtaining 
information from reluctant institutional actors is to employ some type of 
plea bargaining aimed at inducing cracks in monolithic institutions. One 
possibility, proposed by Chile's Aylwin government but rejected by the leg' 
islature, is to allow testimony to be taken secretly, without identifying those 
involved.36 Although keeping the substance of the testimony secret raises 
36. See Alexandra Huneeus, "Chile Still Divided over Rights Trials," S.F. Chronicle, 10 
Sept. 1993, at A14. 
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questions about the procedure's validity as a truth~seeking device, conceal~ 
ing the identity of, or otherwise protecting, those agreeing to provide useful 
information seems a worthwhile bargain. The Salvadoran commission chose 
to maintain the confidentiality of those offering information because wit~ 
nesses in EI Salvador still risk reprisals. Likewise, the Guatemalan agree~ 
ment authorizes confidential testimony. 
A final area where the construction of an authoritative history was 
particularly contested was in the treatment of nongovernmental forces. The 
Chilean, Salvadoran, and proposed Guatemalan commissions frame their 
mandate broadly enough to cover both government~initiated or sponsored 
human rights violations and the violent acts of opponents within the same 
investigation. In EI Salvador the commission had the task of examining the 
most "serious acts of violence" rather than relying on a legal definition of 
which acts constitute human rights violations. The Guatemalan agreement 
calls for the clarification of the "acts of violence that have caused the Gua~ 
temalan population to suffer, connected to the armed conflict."3? In Chile, 
the Rettig Commission was charged with examining not only state actions 
but also ''kidnappings or attempts on the life of persons committed by pri~ 
vate citizens for political purposes."38 
Combining investigation of government acts with those of nongovern~ 
mental forces is another strategy for increasing authoritativeness, creating a 
sense of ''balanced treatment" in a highly charged political situation or, for 
successor governments, avoiding charges of "victors' justice." It may also be 
compelled by an unfavorable balance of forces, in which the military will 
brook no scrutiny of its own actions if those of its opponent are not also 
scrutinized. . 
Yet the authoritativeness can be illusory, and the result a distortion of 
the historical record. One danger is that the two types of violence will be 
seen as functionally equivalent. Thus the cautionary effect on would~be dic~ 
tators or torturers, and the educational effect on the population in general, 
will be lost in the notion that "terrible things happen in all wars and are 
committed by all sides and the only solution is the broadest possible am~ 
nesty." This danger appears to have been exacerbated in the Guatemalan 
agreement which calls for an examination of "acts of violence ... related to 
the armed conflict." This potentially excludes from its scope many ex~ 
tremely serious human rights violations committed by government forces, 
such as forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions of those consid~ 
ered political, but not necessarily military, opponents. On the other hand, 
all acts of violence committed by the guerrillas would presumably be related 
to the armed conflict. 
37. Accord on the Establishment of the Commission (cited in note 28). 
38. Repart of the Chilean National Commission 6 (cited in note 11). 
Truth as Justice 99 
Both the Chilean and Salvadoran commissions attempted to avoid 
these historical distortions by stressing the numerical disparity between the 
violations attributed to the security forces and those attributed to govern, 
ment opponents. The Salvadoran government apparently expected a report 
that would hold both parties more or less equally responsible for serious 
violations in the context of the war and call for a general amnesty in the 
interests of national reconciliation. Yet the commission's investigation and 
analysis led it to a different conclusion. Aside from the numerical imbal, 
ance-only 5% of the cases presented to the truth commission were attrib, 
uted to the FMLN while government forces or paramilitary groups were 
reported responsible for almost 85%-the Salvadoran state was particularly 
culpable because it never fulfilled its responsibility to prevent, investigate, 
and sanction these acts, much less compensate the victims.39 The Rettig 
Commission made similar points, yet was still criticized for characterizing 
the acts of armed opposition groups as ''hum~ rights violations."40 
A further danger is that the opposing sides can deflect criticism of their 
own actions by pointing to "biased" treatment of the other side. The Salva, 
doran government was highly critical of the commission's treatment of 
FMLN actions and used the apparent imbalance in treatment to question 
the commission's overall credibility.41 Thus, despite political necessities and 
the authority,enhancing intent of including nonstate actors within the in' 
vestigation, the results may prove counterproductive. 
B. Redress and the Effect on Victims 
A second major stated goal of truth commissions concerns redress and 
reconciliation. One aspect is the idea that forgiveness requires knowledge of 
what is to be forgiven, which has deep roots in morality and religion.42 A 
second, already mentioned, is the need to overcome the ostracism, isolation 
and anger of the victims and their families. In the Salvadoran case, every 
family had either lost a family member or knew someone who had. In con' 
trast, in Chile, while torture and imprisonment were widespread during the 
days immediately after the 1973 coup, the total number of victims was at 
most 5,000 in a larger total population. It was possible for large parts of the 
39. UN, From Mtulness to Hope 175 (cited in note 22). 
40. See Meta, "Truth and Justice" (cited in note 29). Meta argues that the designation 
of human rights violations should be reserved for the state, and that to characterize terrorist or 
criminal acts of nonstate actors this way is misleading and undermines the educational role of 
a truth commission's report. 
41. See Americas Watch, El Salvador, AccountabiUry and Human Rights: The Report of the 
United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador 25-27 (New York: Americas Watch, 10 
Aug. 1993) ("Americas Watch, El Salvtulor"). 
42. See Ignacio Martin,Baro, S.J., "Reparations: Attention Must Be Paid," 186 Com' 
monweal (23 March 1990). Martin,Baro was one of the Jesuit priests later assassinated in EI 
Salvador. 
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population, especially the middle and upper classes, to have no contact with 
victims of human rights violations, to find plausible the military's denials 
that any such violations were taking place, and to shun those who had pre, 
sumably "done something" to deserve their fate.43 
The commissions all tried in part to respond to the needs of victims 
thtough recommendations focused on reparations, compensation, and com, 
memorative efforts. Two other aspects of the commissions' work also had a 
deep impact on their success in fostering a sense of redress for victims: the 
process of listening to their stories and the presentation of the report. 
It may be that from the point of view of redress, the process of compil, 
ing the commission's report was as important as the final product. Both the 
Chilean and Salvadoran commissions spent considerable time and staff re, 
sources traveling around the country and listening to victims tell their sto, 
ries.44 To finally have a sympathetic hearing from someone backed either by 
the government or by an international organization, after years of fruitless 
petitions to skeptical functionaries, had a powerful effect on victims.4S 
Moreover, the process of providing data, stories, proof from newly discov, 
ered clandestine cemeteries, and the like incorporated larger groups of peo, 
pIe (families, local villages) in an active process of coming to terms with the 
past, not simply a spectator's reaction to a finished product. In EI Salvador 
the commission's, investigation validated the receipt of reliable information 
from marginalized peasant communities who had often not been believed in 
the past. A Guatemalan commission may have a similar effect. 
On the other hand, in EI Salvador the positive effects of the process 
were to a large degree offset by the commission's inability to meet the ex, 
pectations of those who gave testimony. The decision to focus on a smaller 
universe of cases meant that most of those who testified were disappointed 
to find that their case was not among those selected for in,depth treatment. 
The exercise of taking testimony inevitably raises expectations that some' 
thing will happen as a result-that those responsible will be identified and 
possibly punished; that victims and their relatives will be compensated; or 
that, at a minimum, the truth about what happened will be publicly 
disclosed. 
43. See Jaime Malamud-Goti, "Punishment and a Rights-Based Democmcy," Crim. Just. 
Ethics, Summer/Fall, at 7; S. Salimovich, E. Lim, & E. Weinstein, "Victims of Fear: The 
Social Psychology of Repression," in Juan E. Cormdi, P. W. Fagen, & M. A. Garreton, eds., 
Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America 72-89 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992). 
44. In the proposal for a South African truth commission, one of the official objectives 
listed is to provide victims with a platform on which they can "express their plight and tell 
their story." This is the clearest recognition to date of the value of storytelling in coming to 
terms with the past. The bill establishing the truth commission is reprinted in Oxfam South 
Africa, 43 South Africa Watch (9 Sept. 1994). 
45. See Zalaquett, 43 Hastings L.J. at 1437 (cited in note 11). 
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In Honduras the "process" effect was limited by the small size of the 
commissioner's staff and budget. While the Chilean commission hired some 
60 staff members and the Salvadoran commission between 20 and 30,46 Leo 
Valladares worked practically alone. Thus a multiperson commission, and/or 
one with access to significant funding to hire staff, would maximize the 
positive effects of involving people in the investigatory process. 
Another factor affecting a truth commission's ability to provide redress 
for victims is the way in which the report is presented and received. Here 
the Chilean and Honduran cases differed widely from the Salvadoran. In 
the Chilean case, President AylWin received the report and, in a televised 
speech, accepted responsibility as head of the Chilean state for the acts of 
state agents. He apologized to the victims and announced measures to make 
amends. In the Honduran case, too, the report was prepared from within 
existing governmental structures as a way of making clear the state's accept~ 
ance of its responsibility; the current president accepted the report and has 
supported its recommendations. In El Salvador, however, the government 
never accepted the commission's findings of fact as its own. Public acknowl~ 
edgment of past events, which many commentators have found to be re~ 
quired for the internal process of coming to terms with the past,47 may 
depend on the government itself accepting the state's responsibility for the 
past acts. To some degree, representatives of the international community 
may listen to victims and validate their stories. Yet if the state does not 
make the commission's conclusions and recommendations its own or pub-
licly accept responsibility for the harmful acts of its agents, an essential part 
of the process of acknowledgment and subsequent healing may be lost. 
Thus, it is not simply the compilation of the report that matters; equally 
important to success with respect to redress for victims is how, and by 
whom, the report is presented and how the state receives it. 
C. Design and Implementation of the Commissions' 
Recommendations 
One measure of the effectiveness of a truth commission is the degree to 
which its recommendations are accepted and implemented. All three com~ 
missions recommended changes to prevent repetition of the kinds of wide~ 
spread human rights violations they encountered: these included adherence 
to international human rights treaties, decentralization of control over judi-
cial selection and other judicial reform, compensation for victims, and 
46. Buergenthal, 27 VanderbiltJ. Transnat'l L., at 504 (cited in note 31). 
47. See, e.g., Alice Henkin, "ConclUSiOns," in State Crimes: Punishment ar Pardonl (Wye, 
Md.: Aspen Institute, 1989). Thomas Nagel, a participant in the seminar that gave rise to this 
book, distinguishes between knowledge, which existed, and acknowledgment, which was the 
necessary, and missing, factor. 
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measures aimed at professionalizing the military and police and at human 
rights education in general. 
·The recommendations differ in their emphasis, however. The Chilean 
commission focused many of its recommendations on providing reparations 
to victims, on education in human rights, on bringing Chilean law into line 
with international law, and on measures to clarify the fate of those disap, 
peared. While the commission did recommend changes in judicial selection, 
the role of military courts, and criminal procedure, they stopped short of 
anything approaching a complete overhaul of the system. Many of the rec, 
ommendations were to study the possibility of changes in the existing order. 
The Chilean commission's recommendations on compensation were put 
into effect relatively quickly, as were those on setting up an agency to assist 
relatives in searching for the disappeared. Others have been transformed 
into legislative proposals and await action by the Chilean Congress. Some 
of the judicial reform suggestions have also been acted on, through reforms 
to the relevant legal codes, for example. However, many recommendations 
for reform not enacted relatively quickly have slipped into obscurity, as the 
commission's report disappeared from public debate just days after being re, 
leased and provided no built, in mechanism for revisiting recommendations 
unrelated to the continuing search for the disappeared. 
The Salvadoran truth commission's recommendations focused to a 
large extent on immediate judicial and political reform. The differing em' 
phases reflect the two countries' differing history and institutions as well as 
the political context of the commissions' work. Chile during this century 
has generally had elected governments, many of which pursued moderately 
welfare,statist polices; the 17 years of Pinochet's rule were perceived by 
many as an aberration. Apart from this period, the judicial system-while it 
certainly favored the propertied classes and was in need of reform-devel, 
oped a reputation for probity and seriousness. In El Salvador, where dicta, 
torships followed each other in a practically unbroken line, no such 
Institutional legitimacy of government, including the judiciary, ever devel, 
oped. Thus, rather than redirecting and reforming basically functional insti, 
tutions, Salvadorans confront a need to totally transform the structure of 
government. The peace process opened the possibility of undertaking funda, 
mental transformations and the truth commission recommendations sought. 
to promote such changes. 
The Salvadoran truth commission's recommendations won little favor 
in government and military circles. Members of the government's negotiat, 
ing team insisted that the commission had not done what they anticipated. 
Those named were not dismissed from public service, nor were steps taken 
to prohibit them from holding future posts. Most of the constitutional re, 
forms called for to enhance the independence of the judiciary were not ap-
proved, and the Supreme Court roundly rejected th~ commission's findings 
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and recommendations. Under UN prodding the government finally agreed 
in November 1993 to form a group to investigate death squad killings, a 
group that was unable to make much headway. As of late 1994, no steps 
have been taken to establish a compensation fund or a memorial to the 
victims. 
Despite the refusal to accept the report, some recommendations ini, 
tially rejected have had a Significant effect. For example, although the 
Supreme Court refused to step down before the end of its term, no member 
of that Court was reelected by the legislature in June 1994. 
The breadth of the Salvadoran truth commission recommendations, 
especially those regarding total revamping of the Supreme Court and bar' 
ring those persons named in the report from certain offices, made imple, 
mentation of the recommendations difficult. In addition, the political and 
economic context in EI Salvador did not augur well for swift implementa, 
tion of reforms. In Chile and Honduras (as of 1993 at least), as in Argentina 
before them, the incoming governments were headed by politicians with a 
history of concern for human rights and a mandate for change.48 In the 
Chilean case, that history and mandate were tempered by a keen, perhaps 
overly keen, sense of the limitations of a civilian government acting in the 
shadow of a powerful military, but they were nonetheless present. In Hon, 
duras, part of the political will came from the desire on the part of much of 
the governing class to disassociate itself from the unpalatable effects of the 
Nicaraguan contra war of the early 1980s. , 
In EI Salvador, in contrast, although the government had formally 
agreed to implement the truth commission's recommendations, its domestic 
political mandate was for continuity, with the least number of changes pos, 
sible to end the war and disarm the FMLN. Some of those implicated by the 
truth commission, notably former Defense Minister Ponce, were considered 
crucial to ensuring the success of the peace process. Thus, implementing the 
truth commission's recommendations-especially when these were per' 
ceived as going beyond what was agreed to in the negotiations-was not on 
the agenda of then' President Cristiani or the governing ARENA party. 
Moreover, when the recommendations entailed public expenditure, for ex, 
ample, to compensate victims, the two countries were in very different posi, 
tions. While E1 Salvador's economy was destroyed by 12 years of war and 
mismanagement, the Chilean economy was booming, and there were far 
fewer people to compensate. 
To some degree, international pressure has substituted for political will 
in assuring that the recommendations are carried out. The peace accords 
48. See David Pion-Berlin, "To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the 
Latin American Southern Cone," 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 105 (1994). Pion-Berlin argues that the 
presidents' political background and will was a decisive factor explaining differences in policy 
among Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. We believe structural issues were probably more sali-
ent but that these personal differences were nonetheless a factor. 
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built in some pressure for compliance by making both sides agree to follow 
the truth commission's recommendations. Thus, UN verification of compti, 
ance with the accords includes the degree to which the government has 
implemented the recommended reforms. UN sponsorship and international 
involvement also increased the likelihood that international actors would 
press for compliance with the Commission's recommendations. Indeed, UN 
pressure has been behind most recommendations implemented, even those 
ostensibly required by the peace accords.49 These have been primarily the 
recommendations calling for institutional transformation; those that call for 
dismissing certain individuals from public service or barring future public 
service have largely been rejected. Of course, UN pressure is effective 
mostly because it is backed by the promise of foreign aid or the threat of 
withholding it. And despite belated compliance with some of the truth 
commission's recommendations, according to the UN Observer Mission's 
Human Rights Division, impunity remains the leading human rights prob, 
lem in EI Salvador more than a year after publication of the truth commis, 
sion report. 50 
The Guatemalan army and government, learning from their Salvado, 
ran counterparts, refused to commit themselves to carrying out the proposed 
truth commission's recommendations, giving the UN less leverage to insist 
on compliance. 
In Honduras, virtually no action has been taken to comply with its 
recommendations as the one,year period draws to a close. Moreover, U.S. 
government agencies have yet to provide requested information in their 
files. To date, no one has been prosecuted, and the head of the armed 
forces, implicated in the report, has announced his opposition to its recom, 
mendations. The lack of implementation suggests that an investigation car, 
ried out solely by an ombudsman may lack the clout of a specific ad hoc 
commission appointed by the executive or a UN,sponsored effort which is 
more likely to be backed up by international pressure. Commissioner Val, 
ladares has attempted to induce compliance by setting a one,year deadline 
in which to revisit the recommendations, as a way of rekindling public in, 
terest and pressure for change. The inclusion of checkpoints and timetables 
for compliance within the recommendations of the report may save the 
Honduran recommendations from the relative public silence that befell the 
Chilean report, but only if the commissioner and his allies can generate 
enough international as well as internal pressure for compliance. 
49. See Margaret Popkin, "El Salvador: A Negotiated End to Impunity?" in Roht,Ar, 
riaza, ed., Impunity and Human Rights ch. 15 (cited in note 7). 
50. See ONUSAL, Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division for the period 
1 March-30 June 1994, UN Doc. A/49/281,S/1994/886, 28 July 1994. 
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D. Accountability 
A fourth possible area in which to judge the effectiveness of truth com' 
missions is their contribution to establishing individual as well as institu, 
tional accountability for past acts. Many, although not all, human rights 
groups and activists, as well as several international entities, have stressed 
the importance of justice as well as truth in dealing with the past.51 The 
commissions themselves recognize the link between the two. They have es, 
tablished that link in one of two ways: by naming those individuals found 
responsible for killings and disappearances within their report or by passing 
the information on to the court system in the hope that the courts will 
follow up. 
1. Naming Names 
One way to provide some measure of individual accountability for past 
violations is to publicize the names of those thought to be responsible for 
organizing or executing the crimes committed. While public identification 
is neither a criminal sanction nor a civil one, it can have negative effects on 
the reputation, career, and political prospects of individuals. The truth com' 
missions identified a number of individuals through the testimony of wit, 
nesses or victims but took different approaches to using the information.52 
The Chilean commission declined to name individuals, on the grounds that 
only a judicial proceeding could responsibly do so. In the Chilean case, the 
Commission maintained it had neither the mandate nor the resources to 
assure due process for individuals who might be named, and left the ques, 
tion of individual accountability for the courts. It did assign institutional 
responsibility to certain branches of the armed forces for certain crimes.53 
The Guatemalan agreement also bars naming individuals and leaves unclear 
the potential role of the courts by stating that the proposed commission's 
recommendations and report will have no "judicial aim or effect." 
51. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have issued strong statements de-
manding individual accountability for serious human rights violations. The UN General As-
sembly has done the same in the case of disappearances and summary executions. See 
Declaration on the Protection of AU Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133 (18 
Dec. 1992), UN Doc. A!RES/47/133, 12 Feb. 1993; Principles on the Effective Prevention and 
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, ECOSOC Res. 1989/65 of 24 
May 1989, Annex, ECOSOC Off. Rec. 1989, Supp. No.1 (1990), endorsed by G.A. Res. 44/ 
162 of 15 Dec. 1989, GAOR 44th Sess, Supp. No. 49 (1990). See also Inter-American Com-
mission cases and scholarly articles cited supra in note 9. 
52. The Argentine investigatory commission declined to publicly name those identified 
as perpetrators but passed the information along to the relevant courts. The list of those 
named was leaked to the press, however, and soon became public knowledge. Most of those 
named were never tried. 
53. The commission's mandate specifically precluded it from exercising judicial func-
tions. Report of the Chilean National Commission 7 (cited in note 11). 
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Unlike the Southern Cone official commissions of inquiry, the Salva, 
doran truth commission focused on assigning individual responsibility for 
violations through findings of fact. The commission stressed that responsi, 
bility should fall not on the institution but on those who committed or 
ordered violent acts. 54 The commission reasoned that the peace accords 
made very clear that the truth commission was created because the full 
truth must be made known, which necessarily implied naming those respon, 
sible. ''Not to name names would reinforce the very impunity to which the 
parties instructed the Commission to put an end."55 The Salvadoran gov, 
ernment opposed the decision to publish the names and engaged in a diplo, 
matic offensive to convince the UN to omit them, or at least to delay 
publication of the report until after the March 1994 elections.56 
In explaining its work, the commission emphasized that it was not a 
judicial or quasHudicial body, which could determine legal rights or obliga, 
tions.57 The peace agreement authorized the commission to carry out its 
activities on a confidential basis and use whatever sources of information it 
deemed useful and reliable.58 Perpetrators were only named when multiple 
sources or wimesses had confirmed their role.59 Still, the criteria for naming 
some names and omitting others at times appeared unclear and thus raised 
questions about political motivations, especially since the sources relied on 
were not identified.60 
In large part, the Salvadoran truth commission chose to name names 
because it concluded that a long tradition of judicial dysfunction and com' 
plicity made it unlikely, at least in the short term, that any judicial process 
would" follow its report. Naming those responsible for certain notorious kill, 
ings seemed an essential first step in breaking a tradition of impunity. 
The Honduran report took an intermediate approach. While focusing 
on the institutional responsibility of the army high command and of certain 
intelligence or other special units-the most notorious of them now dis, 
banded-it listed the names of those who had headed those units as poten, 
tial targets of judicial investigation. In addition, the report reproduced 
written and verbal testimony before the Inter,American Court of Human 
Rights, which named perpetrators of specific disappearances. 
54. UN, From Madness to Hope 4 (cited in note 21). 
55. Id. at 25. 
56. Americas Watch, El Salvador 12-13 (cited in note 41); Buergenthal, 27 Vanderbilt]. 
Transnat'l L., at 520-22 (cited in note 31). 
57. Some critics maintain that the commission's recommendations barring people from 
holding office are penal sanctions that affect legal rights. This recommendation in particular 
proved so· controversial-and of questionable constitutionality-that it was explicitly re-
jected by Salvadoran political parties. 
58. Truth Commission Agreement, Powers, in UN, Path to Peace 30 (cited in note 18). 
59. UN, From Madness to Hope at 24 (cited in note 5). 
60; Buergenthal, 27 Vanderbilt]. Transnat'l L., at 518-19, 531-32. 
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The authority for an investigatory commission to "name names" be, 
came central to the political struggle over the desirability and the scope of 
the Guatemalan commission. While the army was willing to countenance a 
commission, it conditioned its acquiescence on the omission of names. The 
groups composing civil society also focused much of their criticism on this 
issue, seeing individual accountability as a prerequisite for the report to 
open the possibility of real change. In contraSt to the Chilean case, in Gua, 
temala the justification for omission does not rest on the proper role of the 
courts-the information obtained is not to be turned over to the courts-
but instead reflects the relative weakness of civil society and the continuing 
strength of the military in the peace negotiations. 
2. Truth Commissions, Prosecutions, and Amnesty 
An alternative strategy for pursuing accountability as a goal was to tum 
the names obtained by the truth commission over to the regular courts for 
subsequent prosecution. This route was contemplated in all three existing 
commissions (although it may arguably be barred in the Guatemalan case). 
However, it has proven problematic. 
In general, criminal prosecutions for past violations are among the 
most troublesome issues facing transitional and postwar governments. A few 
countries, notably Greece after the colonels, post,1983 Argentina, and most 
recently Bolivia, tried and convicted high,ranking military officers. Ethio, 
pia has begun to try a number of officials of the Menghistu regime, and 
Hungary has initiated prosecutions of those involved in suppressing the 
1956 uprising. In Germany, a few former Communist Party leaders and a 
number of low,level border guards have been tried. Most countries, how, 
ever, have encountered obstacles to prosecutions ranging from powerful do-
mestic opposition to inadequate judicial machinery to amnesties and long' 
lapsed statutes of limitations.61 
All the countries examined here faced limits on attempts to prosecute 
the military and security forces for the deaths, disappearances, and torture 
they had been responsible for. The militaries, and their civilian supporters, 
retained a major share of power and were disinclined to allow legal action 
against their own. 
The accord which established the Salvadoran Truth Commission was 
designed "without prejudice to the obligations incumbent on the Salvado, 
ran courts to solve such cases and impose"the appropriate penalties on the 
61. On the legal difficulties of prosecutions, see Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and Human 
Rights cbs. 3-5, 21 (cited in note 7). On the political aspects, see, e.g., Samuel Huntington, 
The Third Walle: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991); John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1982). 
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culprits."62 The final article of the agreement establishing the commission 
stated that "the provisions of this agreement shall not prevent the normal 
investigation of any situation or case, whether or not the Commission has 
investigated it, nor the application of the relevant legal provisions to acts 
contrary to law." Moreover, the parties to the peace accords specifically 
addressed the issue of ending impunity in the section on the armed forces.63 
Thus the parties-or at least the peace accords-explicitly recognized 
the need for prosecution as well as establishing and disseminating the truth 
about past rights violations. The apparent intent of the negotiators was not 
to use the truth commission as a substitute for judicial proceedings.64 
However, despite the language of the accords, both parties had reasons 
to favor an amnesty. The governing ARENA party, with its historical links 
to death squads and close allies in the military, argued for a broad amnesty 
in the name of reconciliation. According to ARENA, attempts to redress 
past violations would only destabilize the peace process and, in any event, 
what was at issue were excesses committed during a war in which both sides 
committed violations. The FMLN never publicly favored an amnesty and 
refused to discuss the issue during peace negotiations. Nonetheless, it faced 
the possibility that rights violators connected to or tolerated by the govern, 
ment would escape prosecution while its members could face selective pros, 
ecutions in unreliable (unreformed) courts. 
The truth commission stopped short of recommending prosecutions be' 
cause of the unreliability of the existing judiciary. The commission sug, 
gested that without a drastic overhaul of the judiciary, prosecutions might 
be counterproductive and would be unlikely to achieve fair results. The 
commission was undeniably accurate in its assessment that prosecutions 
were unlikely and untenable under current conditions. It did not take the 
opportunity to suggest that certain crimes could not be subject to amnesty 
on international law grounds.65 In choosing not to do 50, the commission 
18). 
62. See Mexico Agreements of 27 April 1991, in UN, Path to Peace 29 (cited in note 
63. The Accords state: 
The parties recognize the need to clarify and put an end to any indication of impunity on 
the part of officers of the armed forces particularly in cases where respect for human 
rights is jeopardized .... All of this shall be without prejudice to the principle, which the 
Parties also recognize, that acts of this nature, regardless of the sector to which their 
perpetrators belong, must be the object of exemplary action by the law courts so that the 
punishment prescribed by law is meted out to those found responsible. 
Chapultepec Agreements, ch. 1, "Armed Forces," sec. 5, "End to Impunity," in UN, Path to 
Peace 53. 
64. In contrast, the question of amnesty for the perpetrators of human rights violations 
was not directly addressed in the peace accords. The two amnesties granted in the wake of the 
accords are discussed infra at note 66. 
65. The Inter,American Commission on Human Rights, on the other hand, has stressed 
that neither the peace accords nor Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions excuse EI Salvador 
from its obligations under intemationallaw, notably the American Convention on Human 
Rights. See lACHR, Report on Human Rights in El Salvador (cited in note 9). 
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appeared to accept that its t~k had become a de facto substitute for judicial 
action, despite the contrary language of the peace accords. It left open the 
possibility of prosecutions in the future once the judicial system was pre' 
pared to handle them. 
Over the objections of opposition forces, the governing ARENA party 
pushed through a sweeping amnesty law days after the truth commission 
report was released.66 The amnesty law provides for the extinction of civil as 
well as criminal responsibility.67 
The UN Secretary General expressed concern about the immediate 
sweeping amnesty and said that it would have been preferable to have 
achieved a broad degree of national consensus before approving an amnesty 
law.6B The Inter,American Human Rights Commission was even more criti, 
cal.69 Salvadoran human rights groups unsuccessfully petitioned the 
Supreme Court to declare it unconstitutional. 70 A public opinion poll car' 
ried out by the Jesuit Central American University in June 1993 found pub, 
66. Legislative Decree 486,20 March 1993, published in Diario Oficia1 vol. 318, No. 56, 
22 March 1993. The 1993 amnesty followed an earlier 1992 law. Because of the immediate 
need to legalize the situation of FMLN leaders who were returning to the country and would 
be involved in implementing the peace accords, on 23 Jan. 1992, the political parties tushed 
through a National Reconciliation Law. Legislative Decree 147, Diario Ojicia1 vol. 314, No. 
14. The agreement amounted to a delayed general amnesty. It excluded from irs benefits: (1) 
persons convicted by juries, to prevent the release of the two officers convicted four months 
earlier for the killing of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter; (2) those 
named in the Truth Commission report as being responsible for serious human righrs viola-
tions, to allow the Truth Commission to carty out its work before the application of amnesty 
in all cases. The amnesty law was passed on 23 Jan. 1992; the Truth Commission report was 
not made public until 15 March 1993. 
The same article that provided for these exceptions established that the Legislative As-
sembly could overrule them six months after the truth commission issued irs report. Human 
rights groups expressed reservations about the law, which permitted amnesty for crimes that 
cannot be amnestied under international law. 
67. The exceptions to the 1992 amnesty were explicitly overruled by the 1993 law and 
the sLx-month waiting period for legislative action was eliminated. 
68. United Nations, Report of the Secretaty General on the United Nations Observer 
Mission in EI Salvador, UN Doc. S/25812/Add. 1,24 May 1993. 
69. See IACHR, Report on Human Rights in El Sal\lador 69-77 (cited in note 9). The 
commission concluded that "regardless of any necessity that the peace negotiations might 
pose and irrespective of purely political considerations, the very sweeping General Amnesty 
Law passed by EI Salvador's Legislative Assembly constitutes a violation of the international 
obligations it undertook when it ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, be-
cause it makes possible a 'reciprocal amnesty' without first acknowledging responsibility (de-
spite the recommendations of the truth commission); because it applies to crimes against 
humanity, and because it eliminates any possibility of obtaining adequate pecuniary compen-
sation, primarily for victims." Id. at 77. 
70. The nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of EI Salvador filed a petition 
with the Supreme Court on 21 April 1993; Socorro Jurfdico Cristiano "Archbishop Oscar A. 
Romero" and the Human Rights Institute of the Central American University filed another 
petition on 11 May 1993. Both petitions were denied, and the Court ruled that the constitu-
tionality of the amnesty presented a nonjusticiable political question. Resolution of the Peti-
tion for Unconstitutionality ("Demanda de Inconstitucionalidad") presented by Joaqufn 
Antonio Caceres Hernandez, Sala de 10 Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, In-
constitucionalidad No. 10-93, 20 May 1993. 
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lie sentiment against the amnesty law (55.5%), with 77% of those polled 
favoring punishment ofthose who violated rights.71 Despite this criticism, 
the ARENA party seems to have suffered no adverse political consequences 
from its insistence on a sweeping amnesty or the truth commission's find, 
ings that key ARENA members were involved in death squad activities. A 
year afrer issuance of the truth commission report, the ARENA party easily 
won the 1994 presidential, legislative, and municipal elections. 
In Chile, the military barred prosecutions through an April 1978 self, 
amnesty.72 The Aylwin government's platform referred to the need to pro' 
gress toward rescission or annulment of the military's self,amnesty. The 
presidential decree creating the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 
stressed that justice is an additional and separate requirement, affirming 
that "only on the basis of the truth will it be possible to satisfy the basic 
demand for justice and create the conditions essential for genuine national 
reconciliation."73 Moreover, article 1 of the decree points out that truth, 
finding should be understood "without prejudice to any judicial process 
which may arise from these acts". Article 2 adds that "should the Commis' 
sion in the exercise of its functions receive information concerning acts of a 
criminal nature, it will forward it without further ado to the competent 
court." Nonetheless, the new government declined to challenge the am' 
nesty law. 
The commission's report stressed the need for justice in its section on 
preventive measures. 
From a preventive vieWpoint, the full exercise by the state of its puni, 
tive powers is an indispensable step towards national reconciliation 
and thus avoidance of any repetitions of these events. Full protection 
of human rights is only conceivable under the rule oflaw, which means 
that all citizens are subject to the law and to the courts of justice. This 
involves applying the generally applicable norms of criminal laws to 
those who break the rules that ensure respect for human ri~hts. 74 
In presenting the commission's report, President Aylwin asserted that 
the commission had turned over the information it gathered to the relevant 
courts and that the courts would continue to investigate despite the am' 
71. Instituto Universitario de Opini6n Publica, Universidad Centtoamericana Jose Si-
me6n Caiias, Boletfn de Prensa, Ano VII, No.2, 14 July 1993. 
72. Decreto-Ley No. 2191 (1978), Diario Oficial, No. 30.042, 19 April 1978. The am-
nesty applied to all persons who committed criminal offenses between 11 Sept. 1973 (the date 
of the coup) and 10 March 1978. It excepted individuals currently on trial or convicted, 
which meant that most government opponenrs accused of crimes did not benefit. Murder, 
disappearance, totture, kidnapping, and assault were covered by the amnesty, although other 
common crimes were not. U.S. political pressure resulted in a specific exemption for anyone 
involved in the killing of former Ambassador Orlando Letelier and a colleague. 
73. Report of the Chilean National Commission at 7 (cited in note 11). 
74. Id. at 885. 
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nesty. The "Aylwin doctrine" allowed the ordinary courts to go forward in, 
vestigating complaints of disappearances, even though the courts would 
quickly run up against the obstacle of the self, amnesty once they found that 
the victim had been killed under conditions that implicated the military. 
Despite the amnesty, some 200 cases remain before the courts, and 
another 800 cases, although temporarily closed, could be reopened if new 
evidence came to light. In the one case specifically exempted from the am' 
nesty, Colonel Manuel Contreras and Brigadier Pedro Espinoza, former 
heads of the secret police known as DINA, were convicted in 1993 of mas' 
terminding the Washington, D.C. assassination of former foreign minister 
Orlando Letelier and his colleague Ronni Moffitt. They remain free on ap, 
peal. 7S Civilian courts continue to interrogate active army officers in disap, 
pearance cases. In addition, families of victims and human rights 
organizations began a petition drive to force the legislature to nullify the 
amnesty law. Sympathetic legislators introduced bills to force the courts to 
interpret the amnesty law narrowly, although none ever came to a vote. 
As time went on, the army became increasingly dissatisfied with this 
state of affairs. In May 1993, the military staged a show of force outside the 
presidential palace to demand an end to the investigations. The army de' 
manded that the cases be accelerated, and that the hearings, including the 
questioning of active' duty officers, avoid the creation of "demeaning situa, 
tions" for the military. In response, several politicians and members of Con' 
gress proposed ending the investigations altogether, but the proposal failed 
in the legislature. President Aylwin reportedly asked the military to publicly 
acknowledge its responsibility for having wrongfully killed those disap, 
peared and come forward with whatever information it had on the location 
of their remains in order to end the judicial investigations, but army leaders 
refused.76 A bill to appoint additional judges, including military judges, to 
hear the remaining cases also failed. 
Chilean human rights organizations and attorneys have sought unsuc, 
cessfully to overturn the amnesty law in the Chilean courts. In 1990, the 
Supreme Court ruled the amnesty constitutional.77 Nonetheless, the courts 
have continued to hear cases involving military and police abuses during 
the Pinochet years, with mixed results. One court sentenced three former 
police officers to life imprisonment, and another three to shorter terms, for 
the notorious 1985 slaying of three human rights workers, a case not cov, 
75. See, e.g., Julia Meehan, "Former Secret Police Chief to Appeal Jail Sentence," 
Reuters, 13 Nov. 1993. 
76. See, e.g., La Nadon (Santiago, Chile), 1 Aug 1993, at 8. 
77. Corte Suprema, 24 Aug. 1990, case of Insunza Buscunan, Ivan Sergio (recurso de in-
aplicabilidad), 87 (No.2) Rev. de Derecho y]urisprudencia y Gaceta de los Tribunales, May-Aug. 
1990, at 64-86. The Court rejected arguments based on equal protection, on the right to life 
and on international law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Genocide 
Convention. 
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ered by the amnesty. Current police chief General Rodolfo Stange was im, 
plicated in covering up police involvement in these murders, but refused to 
resign despite a req~est from President Eduardo FreL78 In July 1994, a lower 
court ordered the arrest of another former head of the DINA on charges of 
kidnapping and illicit association stemming from the forced disappearance 
of four political activists in 1975. The court held the amnesty did not apply 
to kidnapping because the offense continued until the victims' bodies were 
found. 79 An appeals court in September 1994 denied a request by secret 
police agent Osvaldo Romo to have charges against him dismissed under the 
amnesty law. The court found that the amnesty cannot apply to the killing 
of prisoners in violation of the Geneva Conventions.so 
Other cases have fared less well. Charges against several military agents 
for disappearances were dismissed by the courts under the amnesty law or 
dismissed by military courts. And the lower court decisions permitting pros' 
ecution will eventually be appealed to the Supreme Court which, despite 
some changes in composition, remains deeply conservative. Under current 
Supreme Court precedent, once the lower courts discover that the person 
has been killed and that the military appears to be implicated, the case falls 
under the amnesty law and must be dismissed. Still, the continuing legal 
struggle has kept the issue of the amnesty, and of the military's past acts, 
periodically in the public eye. 
In Honduras, the Valladares report referred directly to the possibility of 
amnesty, declaring that any amnesty must be interpreted consistently with 
international law: Because the most recent amnesty under Honduran law 
recognizes Honduras's international obligation to support and protect 
human rights, Valladares reasoned, an amnesty would be unavailing in cases 
of disappearances and other violations of fundamental rights.81 Therefore, 
the report recommends that the state undertake administrative as well as 
judicial inquiries to identify those responsible for disappearances and to try 
them. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, no prosecutions have been under, 
taken to date. 
In Guatemala, amnesties were passed in 1987 as part of the region,wide 
Esquipulas peace accords and again in 1991. There is once again talk of an 
amnesty as part of the peace process, although the government has commit, 
78. See "Chile Court Raises 'Cut-Throat' Sentences to Life," Reuters, 30 Sept. 1994; 
"Chile: Police Chief Cleared of Charges, Re-assumes Post," Inter,Press Service, 17 June 1994. 
79. See Gustavo Gonzalez, "Chile: Another Trial Pits CivUian Courts against Military," 
Inter,Press Service, 12 July 1994; "Chilean Ex-Colonel Artested in Human Rights Case," 
Reuters North American Wire, 10 July 1994. Two active-duty army officers were also charged in 
the case. 
80. See "Court Punches Hole in 1978 Amnesry: 'State of Wai Argument Backfires on 
Its Authors," Latin American Newsletters, Ltd. 465, 13 Oct. 1994. 
81. Honduras 407-8 (cited in note 23). The report refers specifically to Honduras's obli-
gations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which include the right to a fair trial and to judicial protec-
tion. See supra notes 9, 24. 
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ted itself not to propose such a measure.82 While many political leaders rely 
on the proposition that all sides commit terrible acts during wars and there, 
fore a broad amnesty is called for, key members of the Guatemalan judiciary 
and Public Ministry are keenly aware of the dictates of international law 
which do not permit the amnesty of all crimes. 
Thus, in El Salvador and Chile, despite the declared intentions of the 
peace accords and the new government, some measure of truth became in 
effect a substitute, not a complement, to justice. The Salvador's UN,spon, 
sored truth commission chose to emphasize the unreliability and complicity 
of the existing judiciary and call for its transformation rather than push for 
justice in individual cases. Neither the existing judiciary nor the "transi, 
tion" government of President Cristiani (and now President Calderon) had 
any interest in pursuing prosecutions or even judicial investigations, nor has 
the opposition pushed this issue. In Chile, the Aylwin government at, 
tempted to use the judiciary as a further truth,finding mechanism, despite 
the military's self,amnesties, but with limited results in light of military 
stonewalling and judicial opposition. In Honduras the end result cannot yet 
be determined, but prosecutions seem u~likely. In Guatemala, the truth 
commission agreement has been widely interpreted as an attempt to pre, 
clude prosecutions, although future events and the yet,to,be,formed com' 
mission's interpretation of its mandate remain to be seen. Still, the political 
and institutional impediments to prosecutions-a weak insurgency and civil 
popular movement, an inract and victorious army, a government beholden 
to "institutionalist" army sectors for its support,83 a compromised judici, 
ary-are even stronger there than elsewhere in Latin America. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Investigatory commissions have become an increasingly common tool 
for examining prior periods of widespread human rights violations when 
state institutions have failed to respond to such abuses. The commissions set 
themselves four goals-creating an authoritative record; providing redress 
and a platform for victims; recommending legislative, structural, or other 
changes; and establishing accountability for the perpetrators. How well have 
they done? 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of these commissions has been the 
official presentation of an authoritative history, which counters the former 
regime's account. Although contested by members of the former regime or 
the armed forces, an authoritative description and analysis prepared by 
82. Global Accord on Human Rights sec. 3.1 (cited in note 26). 
83. See Trish O'Kane, "Guatemala: 'Moderates' Retain Upper Hand in the Military, 
Enabling Peace Negotiations to Slowly Move Forward," Notisur-Latin American Political Af, 
fairs, 23 Sept. 1994. 
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respected national figures across the political spectrum or well,known for' 
eign dignitaries will eventually be widely accepted and form the basis of the 
historical record. Moreover, a major success of the commissions is their role 
in listening to, and validating, the stories and the human dignity of the 
victims. This suggests that it is the process of compiling the commissions' 
report, as much as the final product, which is important. In other words, it 
is the involvement of broad sectors of society in providing information and 
in being listened to that is crucial. If this is true, measures like exhumations 
of secret grave sites and ceremonial reburials, taking of oral histories and the 
like, which decentralize the production of history rather than centralizing it 
in a single commission and its staff, might have similar salutary effects. 
Nonetheless, the value of the commissions may be their ability to lend an 
official imprimatur and time frame to the process. 
The commissions have done less well at catalyzing structural change 
and at accountability. Although all the commissions and the institutions 
that created them stated that ending impunity or providing justice were 
fundamental objectives, the results have been rather limited.B4 National 
commissions have been reluctant to name perpetrators and have been more 
inclined to tum their findings over to the courts. But the courts have been 
ill, equipped to handle these cases. Even so, domestic and international pres' 
sure for the courts to handle such cases, to interpret amnesty laws narrowly, 
or to carry out their own investigations may speed the reform process. More' 
over, the public attention focused by truth, telling processes on the crimes 
committed may create a moral and political climate in which prosecutions 
become more feasible. 
After a war in which neither side has emerged as the victor, the calls 
for prosecution are likely to be muted, particularly if the peace process does 
not result in a change in government. A government linked to those who 
committed serious violations in the past is unlikely to favor accountability 
for past deeds, although it may be willing to accept significant reforms to 
prevent their repetition. An insurgency which is becoming part of the polit, 
84. The Argentine case, which we did not examine, might be considered a counterex-
ample. There, a truth commission (the Sabato commission) produced exhaustive information 
on some 8,000 disappeared persons. Trials of the commanders of the military juntaS followed, 
with a number of convictions. However, those convicted were eventually pardoned by Presi, 
dent Menem after serving little jail time; most of the accused were never tried because of laws 
limiting prosecutions (the "full stop" law) and creating a conclusive presumption that almost 
all subordinates were not guilty because they were following orders (the "due obedience" law). 
Thus, while the truth commission served many useful ends, it is unclear whether an end to 
impunity can be counted among irs achievemenrs. For a thorough analysis, see Alejandro 
Garro, ''Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Parrial Failure or Qualified 
Success?" 31 Colum. J. Trans. L. 1 (1993); Malamud-Goti, in Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and 
Human Rights ch. 12 (cited in note 7). 
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ical process may view accountability differently depending on its access to 
power after the peace accords are implemented.85 
The Salvadoran experience suggests that an external authority fulfills a 
somewhat different function than does a national commission. While the 
latter may be better suited to promoting national reconciliation and accept, 
ance by government leaders of the state's role, the former allows some mea' 
sure of accountability where internal political conditions might not 
otherwise permit. Those investigatory bodies most willing to focus on ac, 
countability seem to be those with strong international backing and inter, 
national attention-in addition to EI Salvador, the former Yugoslavia, and 
Rwanda UN commissions are the clearest examples. 
Moreover, as the Salvadoran experience shows, it takes constant moni, 
toring and pressure-not simply a shon,term spotlight-to ensure some 
measures of compliance with recommendations regarding accountability, 
even those merely entailing dismissals. It is unclear how many "transitional" 
situations will be subject to that kind of scrutiny. And international backing 
and involvement will not alone be enough: they could not, for instance, 
overcome the strength of the military and the weakness of both the insur, 
gency and civil institutions in the design of the truth commission for Guate, 
mala. There, the Salvadoran experience led the Guatemalan government's 
negotiators, panicularly the military, to make clear that the historical per' 
spective alone was to predominate and to force a design that expressly bars 
holding individuals accountable. 
Thus truth commissions do not bring about transitions to democracy 
but instead are most useful after such transitions are well underway-once 
there is considerable consensus on the need to break with the past. Espe, 
cially as other countries confront their own transitions, there may be a ten' 
dency to see in the truth commission model something of a panacea-a way 
to avoid both enforced amnesia and the pitfalls of prosecutions. Certainly 
the process of listening to the victims, compiling and publicizing the facts, 
establishing the enormity of the crimes committed and, where achieved, the 
acceptance of responsibility by the state and by the responsible institutions 
85. Thus, a group like the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa will be 
more willing to undertake a process that would lead to the identification of those responsible 
for past violations, including those in its own ranks, than would a former guerrilla force that 
will have lirtle control over the fate of those identified. In fact, the ANC-Ied government has 
proposed creation of a truth commission, which will, in addition to compiling a historical 
record of crimes committed under apartheid and recommending changes to avoid further 
abuses, have the power to recommend indemnity from prosecution for individuals who come 
forward and confess to such crimes. The final decision on whether to grant these pardons will 
be left for President Mandela. Those members of the security forces or other organized groups 
who choose not to present themselves to the commission, confess, and seek indemnification 
will be subject to prosecution. See, e.g., "Mandela \Vill Grant Amnesty to Some: Waivets for 
Political Crimes Will Depend on Full Confessions," Chicago Tribune, 8 June 1994, at A6; Lynn 
Bernt, "South Africa: Negotiating Change?" in Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and Human Rights ch. 
20 (cited in note 7). 
116 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 
and individuals, will go some way toward both accountability and reconcili, 
ation, especially in situations where more is not possible. Yet it would be a 
mistake to conclude from this that truth commissions are always a preferable 
alternative rather than second,best: there are clear limits to their ability to 
deduce individual responsibilities, to match the perceived solemnity and 
weight of a properly functioning court, and to compel production of wit, 
nesses and information. And, instead of contributing to institution building 
or encouraging the courts to take action, they may serve to take serious 
human rights violations out of the sphere of judicial action. Finally, the very 
justification of the commissions, based on a rhetoric of necessary and 
painful cleansing of wounds before a fresh start, may raise unrealistic 
expectations. 
The danger is that commissions will be viewed a priori as a substitute 
for other actions, rather than one of a panoply of initiatives designed to 
uncover the truth, do justice, and thereby facilitate national reconciliation 
after a period of dictatorship or repression. Even the best efforts along these 
lines cannot overcome years or decades of ingrained habits of thought and 
culture. Far more than a truth commission will be necessary to heal the 
wounds and create the conditions for a just society. Nor will legal measures 
alone be able to accomplish these goals. A change in culture, in expecta, 
tions and in institutions are all required. But with all their limitations, these 
kinds of measures can play a crucial role in helping to foster a climate in 
which other necessary changes may take place. 
